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TERRORISM, INSURGENCY AND
GEOPOLITICS: THE ERRORS OF U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY
LOUIS RENE BERES*
"Everything in this world exudes crime," says Baudelaire, "the
newspapers, the walls and the face of man."' Today this is nowhere
more apparent than in the growing peril of international terrorism,
a dreadful assault on nations and individuals that ritually mocks
our pretensions as a civilized species. Yet before we can respond
effectively to this assault, we must first understand that not every
instance of insurgency is an example of terrorism and recognize
that the distinctions between lawful and unlawful insurgency are
important. Although much current scholarship would have us believe that differentiating between terrorists and freedom fighters is
entirely a subjective matter, international law offers a different position--one that is in the best interests of the United States to recognize and respect.

I.
International law has consistently proscribed particular acts of
international terrorism.' At the same time, however, it has permit* Louis RENt BERES is Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue
University. Educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971), he is the author of many books and articles
in the field. His most recent books are AMERICA OUTSIDE THE WORLD: THE END OF U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY (Lexington Books, 1987): TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY: THE NUCLEAR THREAT (Westview Press, 2d ed., 1987); SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NuCLEAR STRATEGY (Lexington Books, 1986); and REASON AND REALPOLITIK: U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY AND WORLD ORDER (Lexington Books, 1984). Professor Beres also writes regular
guest columns for many of the nation's major newspapers.
1. Baudelaire, quoted in CAMUs, THE REBEL 52 (1956).
2. On December 9, 1985, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted
a resolution condemning all acts of terrorism as "criminal." Never before had the Assembly
adopted such a comprehensive resolution on this question. Yet the issue of particular acts
that actually constitute terrorism is left unresolved, except for acts such as hijacking, hostage-taking and attacks on internationally protected persons that had been criminalized by
previous custom and conventions. The practical problem of gaining support for the "extradite
or prosecute" formula even in these cases, remains a serious impediment to effective counterterrorism. On conventional law in force regarding terrorism, see, e.g., the Tokyo Convention
on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20
U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6765, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; the 1970 Hague Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641,
T.I.A.S. No. 7192; and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
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ted certain uses of force that derive from
the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all
peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien
domination and the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the
struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the organs of the United Nations.3
This exemption is corroborated by the United Nations 1974 Definition of Aggression:
Nothing in this definition, and in particular Article 3 [which lists
an inventory of acts that qualify as aggression] could in any way
prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom, and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived
of that right and referred to in the Declaration of Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or
other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to
struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with
the above-mentioned Declaration. 4
International law has also approved certain forms of insurgency
that are directed toward improving human rights where repression
is neither colonial nor racist. Together with a number of important
covenants, treaties and declarations, the United Nations Charter
codifies many binding norms on the protection of human rights.
Comprising a well-defined "regime," these rules of international
law are effectively enforceable only by the actions of individual
states or by lawful insurgencies.
Where it is understood as resistance to despotism, insurgency
also has roots as a permissible practice in the Bible and in the writings of ancient and medieval classics. Support for such insurgency
is not the creation of modern international law. It can be found, for
against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570. See
also the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 16, 1979, entered into force June 3, 1983, for the United States Jan. 16, 1985; the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502; the 1973 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28
U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532; and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.
3. 1973 G.A. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism. See With
Friends Like These, The Americas Watch Report on Human Rights in U.S. Policy in Latin
America 175 (C. Brown ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
4. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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example, in Aristotles' Politics, Plutarch's Lives and Cicero's De
Officiis. This brings us to the first jurisprudential standard, one
commonly known as "just cause." Where individual states prevent
the exercise of human rights, insurgency may express law-enforcing
reactions under international law. For this to be the case, however,
the means used in that insurgency must be consistent with the second jurisprudential standard, commonly known as "just means."
In deciding whether a particular insurgency is an instance of terrorism or law-enforcement, states must base their evaluations, in
part, on judgments concerning discrimination, proportionality and
military necessity. When force is applied broadly to any segment of
human population without distinction between combatants and noncombatants, terrorism is taking place. Similarly, if force is applied
to the fullest possible extent, restrained only by the limits of available weaponry, terrorism is underway.
The legitimacy of a certain cause does not legitimize the use of
certain forms of violence: The ends do not justify the means. As in
the case of war between states, every use of force by insurgents
must be judged twice, once with regard to the justness of the objective, and once with regard to the justness of the means used in pursuit of that objective.
Now, what does all of this have to do with America's efforts to
combat terrorism? The answer, ironically, lies in the fabric of the
American political tradition.5 The people who celebrate the revolution of 1776 are selectively reluctant to recognize the claims of
others to human rights. Or to put it more precisely, we are willing
to recognize these claims when they issue from the Soviet Union or
its allies, but we close our ears and hearts to those who cry out
from anti-Soviet states. The resulting double standard, a condition
created by our overriding commitment to Realpolitik and anti-Sovietism, will generate terrorism against the United States.
Contrary to prevailing views in Washington, terrorism is not es5. The actual conveyance of natural law thought into American constitutional theory-which is largely responsible for the irony of current American foreign policy on human
rights-was the result of John Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Government. While Hobbes
regarded natural law and civil law as coextensive, Locke echoed a more than two thousand
year old tradition with his view that the validity of civil law must always be tested against

antecedent natural law. The codified American "duty" to revolt when governments commit
"a long train of abuses and usurpations" flows from Locke's notion that civil authority can
never extend beyond the securing of man's natural rights. This theory of natural law, which
had been fully secularized by Pufendorf and Vattel as well as by Grotius, is based on clarity,
self-evidence and coherence. Its validity cannot be shaken by the "reality" of bad governments. And its preeminent emphasis on the value and dignity of each individual is not subject to revision by civil law.
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sentially a tactical problem; it is a political problem. It threatens
the United States largely because of our support of authoritarianism in other countries. During the next several years, opponents of
United States-supported regimes in Latin America and South Africa will acquire power and authority, spawning bases for additional anti-Americanism. Sadly, this development can be avoided
only if this country remains true to its own doctrinal foundations.
There has been no learning from lessons of the past. What can
this country hope to accomplish by standing alongside such pariah
states as Chile and South Africa while unleashing insurgents to
"destabilize" less repressive regimes? If we are really interested in
protecting ourselves against terrorism, why do we persist in support
of governments that make terrorism inevitable? If we fear that
Chile will become "another Nicaragua," why did we install the Pinochet regime in the first place? And if we fear that Nicaragua will
become "another Cuba," why do we cling foolishly to interventionist policies that leave the Sandinistas no other choice?
In South Africa, one thing is certain: Sooner or later, the
apartheid regime will be overthrown. When that happens, the successor black majority government will be more or less bitterly antiAmerican, depending on United States' willingness to change
course during the next few years. Should this country begin to act
on its own best traditions rather than the self-defeating expectations of geopolitics, it may still be possible to avoid an irreversible
breach with South Africa. Even more important perhaps, such action would restore Americans' capacity to bear witness as a righteous people.

To succeed, our leaders must recognize an obligation to seriously
oppose any system that outrages the conscience of humankind. Rejecting the cliched syntax of Cold War arguments, our leaders must

take immediate steps to bring United States' policy into line with
the rhetoric of democracy. If the philosophic and jurisprudential

traditions of the Declaration of Independence are to mean more
than ritual pap for fifth grade civics classes, and if we really do
embrace the idea of "just cause" for revolution, then we must accept as self-evident the right of black South Africans to throw off a
government whose design is "to reduce them under absolute
Despotism."
The Declaration of Independence sets limits on the authority of
every government. Since justice, according to the Founding Fathers, must bind all human society, the rights articulated by the
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Declaration cannot be reserved only to Americans. Denying these
rights to others in Latin America and South Africa is illogical and
self-contradictory since such a refusal undermines the permanent
and universal Law of Nature from which the Declaration derives.
The overriding risk of anti-United States terrorism does not lurk
in guerrilla camps or in Soviet machinations. It rests on our own
failure to understand that human rights everywhere are important
and that they are important in themselves. To be effective against
terrorism, United States' policies will require disengagement from
support of all authoritarian regimes. And they will require an end
to our sponsorship of counter-revolutionary forces in Nicaragua and
elsewhere.
In support of the principle that foreign intervention is unlawful
unless it is an indispensable measure to correct gross violations of
human rights, most major texts and treatises on international law
have long expressed the opinion that a state is forbidden to engage
in military or paramilitary operations against another state with
which it is not at war. 6 Nevertheless, the legal systems, as embodied in the constitutions of individual states, reflect the principle that
all states normally must defend against aggression. According to
Hersch Lauterpacht:
International law imposes upon the State the duty of restraining
persons within its territory from engaging in such revolutionary
activities against friendly States as amount to organized acts of
force in the form of hostile expeditions against the territory of
those States. It also obliges the States to repress and discourage
activities in which attempts against the life of political opponents
7
are regarded as a proper means of revolutionary action.
Lauterpacht's rule reaffirms the Resolution on the Rights and
Duties of Foreign Powers as Regards the Established and Recognized Governments in Case of Insurrection adopted by the Institute
of International Law in 1900. His rule, however, stops short of the
prescription offered in the 18th century by Emmerich de Vattel
that states which support insurgency directed at states become law6. Major texts and treaties are considered authoritative sources of international law
according to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 1977 YEARBOOK
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1190.
Today, the long-standing customary prohibition against foreign support for lawless insurgencies is codified in the United Nations Charter and in authoritative interpretations of that
multilateral treaty at Article I and Article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression Resolution,
supra note 4.
7. See 3 LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW (THE LAW OF PEACE) 274, pts. 2-6.
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ful prey of the world community:
If there should be found a restless and unprincipled nation, ever
ready to do harm to others, to thwart their purposes, and to stir
up civil strife among their citizens, there is no doubt that all
others would have the right to unite together to subdue such a
nation, to discipline it, and even to disable it from doing further
harm.8
There is also, as noted earlier, an obligation of insurgent forces to
comply with the humanitarian rules of armed conflict. Notwithstanding this obligation, United States-supported contra rebels in
Nicaragua display indifference to prevailing civilized standards of
international law. As revealed by the infamous manual for the contras prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, the United
States war against the Sandinistas is carried out with open contempt for the norms of discrimination, proportionality, and military
necessity. According to the Americas Watch report on human
rights and United States policy in Latin America, the contras routinely engage in kidnappings, mutilations, torture and murder. 10
States have a reciprocal obligation to treat captured insurgents in
conformity with the basic dictates of international law. Although
this obligation does not normally interfere with a state's right to
regard as common or ordinary criminals those persons not engaged
in armed conflict," it does mean that all other captives "remain
under the protection and authority of the principles of international
law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience."' 2
In cases where captive persons are engaged in armed conflict,
this reciprocal obligation of states may mean an obligation to extend the privileged status of prisoner of war to such persons. This
obligation is unaffected by insurgent respect for the laws of war of
8. E.

VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS

130 (C.W. Fenwick trans. 1916).

9. See Tayacan, Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. (1984). (This manual, translated from Spanish by Congressional Research
Service, was prepared by the CIA for use by the contras.)
10. See Brown, supra note 3, at 175.
i1. Such persons include, for example, those involved in internal disturbances, riots,
isolated and specific acts of violence, or other acts of a similar nature. See THE HAGUE
REGULATIONS CONVENTION (No.IV) RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON
LAND WITH ANNEX REGULATIONS,

done at The Hague, Oct. 18, 1907.

12. Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3314, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S.
31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No.
3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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international law. While all combatants must comply with the rules
of international law applicable to armed conflict, violations of these
rules do not automatically deprive an insurgent combatant of his
right to protection equivalent in all respects to that accorded to
prisoners of war. This right, codified in the Geneva Convention, is
now complemented and enlarged by two protocols.
Protocol I makes the law concerning international conflicts applicable to conflicts fought for self-determination against alien occupation and against colonialist and racist regimes."3 The protocol,
which was justified by the decolonization provisions of the Charter
and by resolutions of the General Assembly, brings irregular forces
within the full scope of the law of armed conflict.
Protocol II, also an addition to the Geneva Conventions, concerns
protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. Hence,
Protocol II applies to all armed conflicts that are not covered by
Protocol I, those within the territory of a state between its armed
forces and dissidents. These dissident armed forces, to be subject to
the jurisdiction of Protocol II, and therefore subject to international
law, must be "under responsible command" and "must exercise
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations . ...
"I
Significantly, even since President Duarte has served as an
elected president, the government of El Salvador has consistently
violated these laws of war. Indeed, according to recent congressional testimony by Aryeh Neier, vice chairman of Americas
Watch, the Salvadoran armed forces are not only mistreating captive insurgents, they are also "causing incalculable harm, incalculable suffering to civilians." 15 With direct United States support, the
Salvadoran army and air force continue to terrorize civilians by
means of "indiscriminate attacks by air, by mortar shelling and by
ground sweeps."' 6 In spite of these serious violations of international law, the official position of the United States is that "there
13. Both protocols are products of the Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts held
through June 10, 1977. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
printed at 72 AM. J. INT'L LAw at 457-502 (1978).
14. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed conflicts, printed at 72 AM. J. INT'L
LAW at 502-09 (1978).
15. See Developments in El Salvador, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Western
Hemisphere Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3 (1985).
16. Id.
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has been substantial progress" in ending human rights abuses in El
17
Salvador.
Of course, there are many expressions of current United States
foreign policy that are fundamentally sound and cannot simply be
changed to reduce the threat of terrorism.18 Anti-Americanism cannot be eliminated altogether, and even the most correct foreign policies will not render us invulnerable. This means that viable strategies of prevention and control lie in part in high-quality intelligence
gathering and in efficient police or military operations. Expanded
patterns of cooperation between similarly postured governments
could also contribute to a viable strategy. These patterns must be
based on the idea that even sovereignty must yield to the requirements of justice. 1 9 They must, therefore, take the form of enforceable agreements between particular states which promise mutual
protection and support for responsible acts of counter-terrorism.
Such arrangements must entail plans for cooperative intelligence
activities and for exchange of the resulting information, an expanded and refined tapestry of agreements on extradition of terrorists and multi-lateral forces to infiltrate terrorist organizations
and, if necessary, to take action against them. Counter-terrorism
plans should also call for concerted use of the media to publicize
terrorist activities and intentions as well as counter-terrorism emergency medical networks. Such arrangements might also entail limited and particular acts of cooperation between states directed toward effective counter-terrorism.
International arrangements for counter-terrorist cooperation
must also include meaningful sanctions for states which sponsor or
17. See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984. Report Submitted to
the Comm. on Foreign Relations, Senate, and Comm. on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, by the Department of State, Washington, D.C., Feb. 1985, at 513.
18. One example is United States support for Israel, a country that supplies us with
valuable intelligence information and with a reliable potential staging area for United States'
military forces. Moreover, even if this country shifted its allegiance away from such support,
it is unlikely we would benefit from a reduced threat of terrorism. America has been a supporter of Israel since 1948, but has become a victim of Middle Eastern terrorism only during
the past several years. In view of the multiple bases of conflict in the Middle East, this
country would continue to be perceived as an enemy by various states and terrorist groups in
that region whatever its posture toward Israel. This is because these states and groups oppose
what they perceive as (a) partisan United States intervention in their domestic political affairs (e.g., Lebanon); (b) partisan United States involvement on the side of the "moderate"
Arabs; (c) partisan United States involvement on behalf of Iran; and (d) sectarian United
States support for certain forces that resist the gathering tide of Islamic fundamentalism.
19. An example of this can be found in the involvement of three United States military
officers in the ill-fated Egyptian commando hostage rescue effort on Malta in November,
1985.
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support terrorist groups and activities.2 0 As in the case of sanctions
applied directly to terrorists, such sanctions may include carrots as
well as sticks. Until every state in the world system acknowledges
that support of counter-terrorist measures is in their own interests,
individual terrorist groups will have reason and opportunity to
mount their violent excursions.
II.
Since the end of the Second World War, there has been a revolution in international legal affairs. Among other things, this revolution has essentially removed a state's treatment of its own nationals
from the realm of "domestic jurisdiction" whenever such treatment
fails to conform to particular normative standards. Expanding on
the long-standing principle of humanitarian intervention, the Nuremberg Judgment and Nuremberg Principles placed additional
and far-reaching limits on the authority of particular states. The
individual human being, as the ultimate unit of all law, is entitled
to the protection of humankind when the state tramples on his
rights "in a manner that outrages the conscience of mankind."
Based on this reasoning, the Tribunal firmly established the obligation of states to intervene in the affairs of other states whenever
such outrages are committed.2 1 The United States, of course, cannot undertake to be the world's policeman, but it can do better than
base its policies of intervention on a self-defeating political distinction between "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" regimes.
In the absence of viable community enforcement capabilities and
given our decentralized international society, the opportunities for
justice require voluntary patterns of compliance and support by individual governments. The prevailing expectation is that such patterns will be especially and consistently acknowledged by the
world's major powers. It follows that punishment of gross violations
20. In this connection, it is more than a little ironic that while the United States seeks
sanctions against Libya for its support of terrorism, the Reagan administration continues to
support the contra terrorists in their actions against the Nicaraguan government. Although
support of foreign insurgencies may be lawful if it is occasioned by a genuine commitment to
humanitarian intervention and if it is conducted according to the obligations of jus in bello,
neither criterion is met by the United States in its operations against Nicaragua. Indeed, the

Reagan administration now lists Nicaragua as a principal state sponsor of terrorism because
of its alleged support for Salvadoran insurgents-a charge that has never been credibly
documented.
21. International Military Tribunal, I Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg, Judgment 218 (Nov. 1, 1945-Oct. 1, 1946),
published by the Secretariat of the Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1947-1949.
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of human rights is now well within the jurisdictional scope of
American foreign policy.
If the United States continues to turn its back on responsible enforcement of the international law of human rights, it will lose not
only its few remaining claims to moral leadership, but also its last
practical chance for coping with terrorism. Indeed, the Reagan administration's policy on human rights may soon lose this country its
friends as well. The problem lies in recognizing the principle of
"just cause" for insurgency (a principle enshrined in our traditions
and in the law of nations), and in distinguishing between lawful
and unlawful insurgencies under international law. 2
The American imperative, therefore, must be to condemn not
only insurgent terror, but also "regime" terror. Regime terror,
which contradicts the extant rules and principles of international
law, breeds insurgent terror. If the United States is to be true to
the basic ideals of its founding documents as well as to its international legal obligations and long-term geopolitical interests, it cannot continue to support the former while combatting the latter.2"
Today, the United States still tolerates many countries denying
their citizens essential human rights so long as there is consistent
support for cooperative anti-Sovietism. Founded on the spurious dichotomy between "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" regimes, this
policy stipulates that violations of human dignity from the political
right are acceptable, but that from the left they are not. Myopic
and misconceived, this policy will inevitably fail as the oligarchs are
eclipsed and their successors join the expanding legion of antiAmerican states.
To prevent such failure, the Administration need only begin to
adhere to its own national legal obligations. The basic principles of
the international law of human rights have already been "incorporated" into the laws of the United States. Complying with these
22. Interestingly, the most recent official United States government definition of terrorism does not allow for "just cause." According to a September 1984 definition offered by
the Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "[tierrorism is the use or threatened use
of violence for political purposes to create a state of fear that will aid in extorting, coercing,
intimidating, or otherwise causing individuals and groups to alter their behavior." Dep't of
State Bureau of Public Affairs, International Terrorism, GIST, Sept. 1984. By this definition, of course, the 18th century revolutionary insurgency that led to the creation of the
United States was pure terrorism. Similarly, the United States-supported contras are also
terrorists by this definition.
23. In this connection, the Administration should take another look at its own annual
State Department Report, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, supra note 17, a

report that regularly identifies a large number of countries that engage in the systematic and
unlawful denial of essential human rights to their citizens.
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principles would effectively limit terrorism against the United
States. This point was understood by former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance who offered the following observation: "We pursue our
human rights objectives, not only because they are right, but because we have a stake in the stability that comes when people can
express their hopes and find their futures freely. Our ideals and our
interests coincide." 2 4 Who, exactly, are the terrorists? Are they the
black South African guerrillas who oppose a white minority-ruled
apartheid regime? 5 Are they the individuals among the neighboring frontline states who support black South African insurgents?
Are they the Namibians who support the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in a United Nations-sanctioned opposition to South African control? Are they the Salvadoran rebels?
Are they also the rightist "death squads" that operate throughout
Latin America? What about the Afghan Moslem guerrillas combatting Soviet troops or Iran's ethnic Kurds? What about Unita
and the contras?
The problem, of course, is exceedingly complex. During the coming months, the United States will have to make very critical distinctions between terrorists and legitimate insurgent movements.
These distinctions will have to be based on more important criteria
than shortsighted Cold War positions. Even in narrow geopolitical
terms, a continuing American retreat from human rights in foreign
affairs will ultimately have devastating repercussions. In South Africa, for example, the winds of change are clear and unstoppable.
At some point in the near future, as Bishop Tutu observed on a
visit to the United States in January, 1986, our access to that country's vital mineral resources will depend on our commitment to
black majority rule.
This country has not always been opposed to its own best traditions. In America's early years, George Washington noted: "The
foundations of our national policy must be laid in the pure and im' Accepting
mutable principles of private morality." 26
the wisdom of
24. Testimony of Cyrus Vance before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Mar. 27, 1980, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing

Office).
25. On the particular crime of apartheid, see International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, July 18, 1976, G.A. Res. 3068, 28
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30), U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). See also International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, G.A. Res. 2106A,
20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
26. See Washington's Farewell Address, Sept. 17, 1776, Message and Papers of the
Presidents, Washington D.C., 1897, Vol. 1, at 219 (J.Richardson ed.).
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our first president, President Reagan must change the current direction of United States policy before it is too late. Although opposing terrorism in every form is both correct and pragmatic, we must
first acknowledge that there is a lawful definition of terrorism.
As we have seen, current policies that spawn terrorism against
the United States also ensure the opposition of burgeoning governments. During the next few years, insurgents fighting against regime terror in various countries will likely prevail. Installed with
authority, these former rebels will become enemies of the United
States.
What will happen when the opponents of the United States supported regimes in Latin America and South Africa mount successful insurgencies, creating successor governments with strongly antiAmerican views? The answer is entirely predictable. Unless there is
a prompt shift to lucidity in Washington, this country will begin the
next phase of geopolitical competition, starting its own insurgencies
to topple regimes that are now left-wing. Resembling the administration's current war against Nicaragua, these insurgencies-conducted by "freedom fighters"-will seek to bring down
governments that will be denounced as "Soviet pawns." By this reasoning, the present conditions of apartheid and repression (as with
Somoza's rule in Nicaragua) will be described as the "lesser evil."
III.
The true danger of terrorism lies not in the guerrilla camps of
Central America and southern Africa. The enemy lies in ourselves.
To meet the requirements of effective counter-terrorism, the United
States must oppose repressive regimes and movements whatever
their ideological stripe. It must also support those insurgencies that
spring genuinely from "just cause," and that are carried out with
due regard for the laws of war of international law.
The United States cannot have it both ways. There is little point
to our condemnations of state-supported terrorism against American interests in the Middle East if we support our own terrorists in
Central America. Moreover, there is little point in bemoaning terrorist indifference to the humanitarian rules of armed conflict when
contra rebels display total disregard for them.2
27. Ironically, Secretary of State Shultz has often stated his commitment to the laws
of war of international law and to the understanding that these humanitarian rules of armed
conflict apply as well to insurgent forces: "The grievances that terrorists supposedly seek to
redress through acts of violence may or may not be legitimate. The terrorist acts themselves,
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The correct actions taken by the Reagan administration to oppose terrorism in the Middle East stands in ironic contrast to its
pro-terrorist stance in Nicaragua. By its forceful action against the
Palestinian hijackers who defiled every civilized standard of humanitarian international law in the Achille Lauro tragedy, the
Reagan administration advanced the highest principles of engagement in the war against terrorism. Yet by its relations with Nicaragua, the administration still casts its lot with the terrorists. But in
refusing to submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the case brought by Nicaragua, the administration can hardly lay claim to lawfulness. In this connection,
United States' credibility as a rule-abiding member of the community of nations is further undermined by the administration's direct
violation of the World Court's interim judgment of May 10, 1984,
a judgment requiring the United States to refrain from any continued support of the contras.
Driven by ideological antipathy for a Marxist regime in this
hemisphere, President Reagan has willfully subordinated the rule of
law to the presumed imperatives of power politics. Left unchanged,
our inconsistent policies toward terrorism will generate worldwide
indifference to American indignation and far-reaching constraints
on American power.
In the end, as we learn from Goethe, "we depend upon creatures
of our own making." Understood in terms of the American imperative to combat terrorism, Goethe's wisdom suggests a far-reaching
United States disengagement from the self-defeating dynamics of
anti-Sovietism. Without such disengagement, this country will continue to support authoritarian regimes as a "necessary evil."
There is another reason why steps toward United States-Soviet
reconciliation would reduce the threat of anti-American terrorism.
At a moment in history where the Soviets seek far-reaching efforts
at arms control and disarmament, such steps could encourage them
to offer certain geopolitical concessions in exchange for greater security from nuclear war. An example of such concessions might
well be diminished Soviet support for states that sustain terrorists
groups, for example, Libya.
If, indeed, the Soviet Union were genuinely assimilable to the
however, can never be legitimate. And legitimate causes can never justify or excuse terrorism. Terrorists' means discredit their ends." See Terrorism and the Modern World, Dep't of
State Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., Oct. 25, 1984, Current Policy No. 629, at
3.
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spirit of evil-a current article of faith in Washington-no reconciliation would be possible. If this were so, the United States would
perceive no alternative but to support repressive anti-Soviet regimes. And it would further perceive no alternative to constant
struggle for geopolitical advantage, a judgment that would be reciprocated by the Soviet Union. As a result, we could expect an
increasing incidence of terrorism against the United States.
But the prevailing American view of the Soviet Union is a caricature, not a reality. Fashioned in the ruins of thought, this caricature draws the United States further and further away from its own
interests. There is still time for a change in direction, toward secular political competition and away from dangerous theological conflict between "good" and "evil." In acknowledging this differentiation, America could begin to understand the imperatives of effective
counter-terrorism. Abandoning the sterile polarity that obscures its
mental horizon, we could begin to take our first essential steps toward real safety from terrorist attack.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol17/iss1/8

14

